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A Reflection on State Inclusive Response to Sunni-Shi’a Tension in
Indonesia’s Democracy
Abstract
Most studies on the Sunni-Shi'a conflict concentrates on the failed peaceful
resolution due to the state’s discrimination against the minority religious groups in
Indonesia. However, these studies overlook other spectrums of the progressive
role of the state agencies in religious conflict resolution. This paper examines the
state engagement in the peaceful resolution of religious conflict through an
inclusive policy-making. A case study of the Sunni-Shi’a conflict 2016 in
Bondowoso (East Java) showed that the local government is committed and has
an inclusive policy to protect or strengthen civil rights, especially for groups that
are crucial to the quality of democracy. Based on Carson and Hartz-Karp’s
theoretical framework, this paper shows that the local government policy has
represented a model of limited deliberative conflict resolution. Although this
policy was a product of public openness and willingness to hold a discussion,
negotiation, and to compromise, the decision made was still exclusionary to the
involvement of the Shi’a minority group.
Keywords: Sunni, Shi’a, religious conflict, local government, deliberation, and
democracy.
A. Introduction
Indonesia has witnessed a rapid surge in violence since the end of the New
Order era in 1998. However, the violence largely targets minority groups within
and outside the Muslim community. The 1999 clash between Muslims and
Christians in various regions, such as Ambon (the capital and largest city of the
Indonesian province of Maluku) and Poso (a regency of Central Sulawesi
province of Indonesia), showed communal conflict in religious followers. The
inter-religious conflict in the Muslim community, particularly Sunni versus Shi’a,
Ahmadiyya, and other Islamic minority groups, escalated in the early 2000s
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The growing number of religious violence towards Shi’a groups, such as
what happened in Batang (Central Java) in 2000 and 2006, Bangil (East Java)
2006 and 2016, Sampang-Madura (East Java) in 2001, and Yogyakarta in 2013,
(Formichi, 2014; Hilmy, 2015; Miichi, 2016; Makin, 2017), triggered significant
attention and intensive debates of some Indonesia’s politicians and Islam scholars.
One of the interesting topics debated is the stand of the state on religious violence
to minority groups. The state has failed to show a democratic stance in ensuring
the freedom of belief for all citizens without discrimination. Instead of being an
autonomous and neutral political institution from any influence (Weber, 1968),
the state seemed powerless in dealing with intolerant forces that often discredited
and persecuted the Shi’a minority groups (Bush, 2013; Akmaliah, 2015; Kovacs,
2013).
According to scholars, the state’s weakness in protecting the minority
group is attributed to its inability to perform its obligation, such as ensuring
security and keeping public order and maintaining autonomy in facing intolerant
groups (Ali-Fauzi, 2011). For example, in the Sunni-Shi’a conflict case in
Sampang, the intolerant group successfully forced the state to pass public policy
that favored their religious aspiration. Due to the issuing of East Java Governor
Regulation Number 55 in 2012 on Religious Activity Guidance and Deviant Sect
Monitoring, the relocation of the Shi’a community in Sampang to Puspa Agro
apartment (Sidoarjo), and the two-year imprisonment sentence by Sampang
District Court to ustadz Tajul Muluk was strongly affected by the strong influence
of conservative Islam groups (IPAC, 2016; Mustamir, 2015; Wahyudi, 2015).
The state’s failure to protect minority groups is closely related to its
chosen stance which tended to cooperate with intolerant groups. Such a stance
was bluntly shown by Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s (SBY) presidency. In many
cases, the president passed policies in favor of the conservative Islamic groups.
For instance, as MUI issued a Fatwa on allegedly deviant sects in 2005, the first
years of SBY’s presidency, attacks on minority groups kept increasing.
Contrastingly, SBY only condemned the incident and labeled it as a horizontal
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attack committed by an Islamist group on a minority (Suryana, 2017; Mietzner,
2018; Bush, 2013).
This paper analyzes the state’s stance in responding to various religion-
labeled sectarian conflict. It proposes that Indonesia’s state in the post-New Order
era did not show a monolithic picture compared to what happened in the previous
periods. As the decentralization policy was implemented, each region showed its
plural socio-political dynamics. The local governments (the representative of the
state) successfully showed inclusive, clean, and good governance. In general, a
government system runs based on principles of transparency, accountability, and
non-discrimination (http://www.coe.int).
What happened in Bondowoso (East Java), the location of this study,
confirmed the inclusive stand that the local government took in response to the
Sunni-Shi’a conflict. Although the Governor Regulation (Peraturan
Gubernur/Pergub) and East Java MUI’s Fatwa recommended the local
government institutions to actively play their role in guiding and monitoring
allegedly deviant religious sects, the Bondowoso Regency government opted to
take a different path. Rather than positioning an exclusionary stand, the local
government opted for inclusionary policy in dealing with religious conflict –
conflicts that relate to values, claims, and identity, which involves religious issues
(Ali-Fauzi, 2011). This involved Sunni mainstream Islam and the Shi’a minority
group (Zainul Hamdi, 2017).
This paper conceptualizes the state as a compulsory political organization,
whose administrative staffs successfully hold up the claim to the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of order (Weber, 1968). The
state in this paper is not merely an autonomous political organization or immune
from the influence of other social forces (Migdal, 2001). This paper
demonstrates that the state consists of various parts, and the state is full of
contradiction among its parts. The state’s different units also urge negotiation,
contestation, and domination among themselves, which could result in the
discrepancy of the state’s policies and practices. For this reason, the state is the




































The state is an inclusive concept that encompasses all aspects of policy-
making and the application of laws. In comparison, the government is an agent or
institution that implements state policies in a political society. However, there are
institutions other than the government which become part of the state, including
administrative institutions of the state or bureaucracy, the military and the police,
the judiciary, the governments in the regions, and parliamentary assemblies.
Therefore, the government is an agent of the state, through which the state’s
purposes are formulated and executed (Englehart, 2007; Budiman, 1996).
This paper is based on my ethnographic research for six months in
Bondowoso between 2017 and 2018. The research was useful to boost the
understanding of the practice of local state officials in response to the Sunni-Shi'a
conflict. More than 15 participants were interviewed, including regents, local
bureaucrats, the regional people's representative council, security forces, local
leaders of NU and Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian ulama council, religious
harmony forums, religious leaders (kyai), and people who know the anti-Milad
Fatimah mass mobilization and the process of public policies followed by local
governments. Full consent for all the data in this paper, including the name of
informants, was gained. Apart from these methods, secondary research was used
to make sense of the practice of local state officials. Data about this practice was
gained by reading and analyzing media reports. This research method is useful to
help gain a deeper understanding of local state officials in decision-making for
Sunni-Shi’a conflict resolution.
The research questions for this study focus on how the inclusionary
methods implemented by the local government in managing Sunni-Shi’a conflict
and the extent to which local government’s inclusionary policy in managing
Sunni-Shi’a conflict represents the principles of deliberative or participatory
democracy. Quoting Carson and Karp’s (2001: 120-138) perspective, this paper
analyzes public policies taken by local governments by considering three
important aspects. These include (1) influence, where the process should have the
ability to influence policy and decision making, (2) inclusion, where the process
Based on the description above, it is clear
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should be representative for the population and inclusive to diverse viewpoints
and values, providing equal opportunity for all to participate, and (3) deliberation,
where the process should provide open dialogue, access to information, respect,
space to understand and reframe issues and move toward consensus.
The paper begins with a discussion of the rise of the anti-Shi’a movement
in Bondowoso, followed by the local government’s response to the anti-Shi’a
mass mobilization in 2016. The last section focuses on public policies taken by
the local government in relation to Sunni-Shi’a conflict resolution in the line of
deliberative perspective.
B. The Anti-Shi’a Movement
Bondowoso, one of the regencies located in the eastern area of East Java,
serves as the epicenter of Sunni-Shi’a sectarian tension. There were several
tensions involved in these two groups during the post-New Order period. First,
there was a forced dissolution of the Bondowoso IJABI Regional Administrator
inauguration by a mass from conservative-radical on June 4, 2006. Another
incident was the mass tension when a student of Al-Wafa Islamic Boarding
School in Jambesari owned by kyai Musowir, a leader of the Shi’a group was
punched on August 12, 2006. There was a mass rampage that attacked participants
of Shi’a mass sermon and burned kyai Musowir’s house on September 12, 2006.
Fourth, another forced dissolution by a mass occurred during the IJABI
anniversary and routine mass sermon event in Jambesari on December 23-24,
2006 (Syaukani, 2009).
An equally or more heated Sunni-Shi’a tension as the incidents occurred
when a mass refused Milad Fatimah 2016 event, an annual rite organized by the
Shi’a community. This event was organized in remembrance of the birth of
sayyidah Fatimah Az-Zahra, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad. In their
refusal, the anti-Milad Fatimah groups organized a mass demonstration to protest
this event. As the day for the Milad Fatimah event was getting closer (April 3), a
mass marched to urge the government to not issue any permit for the Milad
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counter rite in the form of a great mass sermon and collective prayer centralized at
Masjid Jami’ At-Taqwa (interview with habib Baqir, November 25, 2017 & 2018).
In the resistance, the anti-Milad Fatimah groups used various issues,
including the deviance and dangers of Shi’a credo for the real Islam teachings,
mut’ah marriage, an insult to the Prophet’s companions, and against NKRI. In
many banners and posters during the rally, the writing was ‘the very existence of
Shi’a in Indonesia divide the (Islamic) followers and is an actual threat to the
nation’s unity’. For this reason, the mass demanded the local government not to
issue the permit for organizing the Milad Fatimah event. Issuing the permit meant
legitimating the Shi’a community with their deviant teachings (Interview with
kyaiMudassir, November 24, 2017).
Although it was prevalent, the use of religious sectarian issues was proved
effective enough to trigger cross-group Muslims’ emotions to be involved in the
mass rally. Framing such an issue reminds individuals of the successful 212
movements in Jakarta. Both shared the use of religious sentiment to mobilize the
mass to influence the government’s policy. Over a mass of 3500 people was
relatively big for a regency. The anti-Milad Fatimah protest was recorded as the
largest Islamic rally in the history of refusal protest against Shi’a in Bondowoso.
It was also in this protest that the alliance of various conservative and radical
Islam groups could be realized. One of the shared elements that united them in a
religious coalition was the anti-Shi’a sentiment (Ichwan, 2012).
The collective anti-Milad Fatimah rally involved a large mass from the
various socio-religious background and an alliance between the borrowing Jeremy
Menchik’s term and Godly Muslims (Menchik, 2014). They comprised of
conservative NU, radical FPI, Al-Irsyad Wahabi, and Salafis that defended a very
conservative, literal interpretation of Islam and treat Shia Muslims with hostility,
including PKS and HTI activists. Unlike the Aksi Bela Islam (Action for Defend
Islam), which placed FPI as its main spokesperson, the protest to refuse Milad
Fatimah in Bondowoso was initiated by conservative NU’s elites. They gathered
in a coalition called FOKUS (Forum Komunikasi Ulama Sunni or Sunni Ulama
Communication Forum) (Interview with Syaeful Bahar, November 25, 2017).
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The conservative NU youth also took similar initiatives and steps. They
formed a movement organization called GERPAS (Gerakan Pemuda Anti-Shi’a
or Anti-Shi’a Youth Movement). This organization was initiated and pioneered by
a young rising kyai who graduated from Sidogiri Islamic Boarding School,
specifically Kyai Mudassir. According to the Kyai, the formation of this
organization was inspired by the ijtihad of national Muslim figures in forming
Aliansi Nasional Anti-Shia (ANNAS) or the National Anti-Shi’a Alliance, which
emerged as a response to Sampang Sunni-Shi’a conflict in 2011 (Syarif, 2017).
Through GERPAS, the Kyai was actively involved in disseminating, collecting,
and mobilizing Muslim Millenials to join and be involved in the Defend Aswaja
rally to refuse the Milad Fatimah event (Interview with kyai Mudassir on
November 24, 2017).
The two mainstream anti-Shia organizations, FOKUS and GERPAS, drove
the anti-Milad Fatimah rallies. The proponents of this movement were aware that
a social movement could not succeed and had a strong pressure power without
support from other groups. In this context, they expanded their coalition by
allying with other groups. The Muslim elites from FPI, elites from conservative
Islamic boarding schools, Wahabi/Salafi groups from Al-Irsyad organization
wings, PKS, and HTI activists were involved in this alliance (Interview with
Matkur November 6, 2017 ).
C. State’s Inclusive Response
The failure of peaceful conflict handling is more attributed to the absence
of the state. This paper does not fully agree with the assertion that the state's
presence guarantees a better conflict resolution. For instance, the state’s
militaristic intervention during New Order in every public issue, including in
managing diversity, differences, and social turbulence, was ineffective in creating
a peaceful conflict resolution. The state successfully suppressed any social
turbulence, preventing it from escalating into conflict and creating social stability.
However, social stability was built not based on democratic conflict management.










In reality, it was theseDihapus[Editor]:
, i.e.Dihapus[Editor]:
, which servedDihapus[Editor]:
purpose of driving theDihapus[Editor]:









does not necessarily guarantee thatDihapus[Editor]:
conflict will be resolvedDihapus[Editor]:
had been provenDihapus[Editor]:
It was true that theDihapus[Editor]:





elements and relevant stakeholders (Vitale, 2006). Therefore, such a centralistic
conflict management model relying on a militaristic approach often led to
artificial conflict resolution. The conflict prospects suppressed under the tight
control of the military regime for years later resurfaced with violence once the
New Order collapsed (Tomagola, 2003).
The state’s presence with an ambivalent stand in response to a conflict was
proved unable to create a peaceful conflict resolution. The stance showed by
SBY’s presidency in responding to the Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Sampang (East Java)
and Ahmadiyah in Kuningan (West Java) could be used as a reference. A’an
Suryana’s research showed that at the national level, the central government in
one momentum showed its enthusiasm in protecting the minority rights to
embrace their own beliefs. In another momentum, the government showed an
accommodative and tolerant stance to the perpetrators of violence on behalf of a
religion (Suryana, 2017).
The state’s existence with its intolerance towards the minority also gave a
considerable contribution to the failed peaceful conflict resolution. This assertion
was proven by Ken Miichi and Yuka Kayne, Johan Wahyudi, and Hary
Widyantoro’s studies on the Sunni-Shi’a conflict in Sampang. In these cases, the
state failed in maintaining its independence and was hijacked by the intolerant
groups. The policies issued by the state tended to be discriminative to the minority
group. Furthermore, the decision of the Sampang Regency Government to
relocate the Shi’a group to GOR (gymnasium) Sampang and then to Puspo Agro
apartment Sidoarjo (East Java) on June 20, 2013, was one form of discriminative
policy. This policy was passed as the regency government’s response to a fatwa
from kyai or ulama in Sampang, particularly those allied in MUI (Miichi, 2016;
Wahyudi, 2015; Widyantoro, 2017).
In contrast to the New Order government stances, SBY’s presidency, and
local government in Sampang (Madura), the Bondowoso Regency government
showed commitments to strengthen an array of civil rights crucial to the quality of
local democracy. In the demands of the mass that refused the Milad Fatimah 2016
event, the Regent Amin Said Husni bravely took an unpopular option by
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permitting the Shi’a group to continue with their religious event. The regent even
ensured that the Milad Fatimah event in a public space could be held safely and
free of any intimidation, threat, and persecution, particularly from the mainstream
Islam group with their intolerance towards Shi’a. The regent also gave the same
opportunity to the anti-Milad Fatimah groups to express their demand without
forcing their wish.
Currently, the local government has prioritized a persuasive
approach in managing diversity, differences, and potential conflicts
among religious communities in Bondowoso. This approach is
considered to be more beneficial for the life of religious people.
However, the violent approach only sacrifices the religious
communities in general. This attitude was also shown by the local
government in responding to the tensions and conflicts between
Sunni and Shi'a groups recently. I have a different understanding of
the Shi'a group, but as the leader of the regional government, I have
to take regulation and laws-based policies that can benefit all
citizens (Interview with Amin Said Husni, November 20, 2017).
In making either decisions or public policies as a response to Sunni-Shi’a
tension, the local government did not do that centrally or in a top-down manner.
Rather, they involved the relevant stakeholders including government agencies,
security apparatus, and Islam civil society organizations. During the mass rally to
protest the Milad Fatimah 2016, the Regent Amin Said Husni immediately
coordinated and communicated with the related government bureaucracy.
Intensively, the regent coordinated with Bakesbangpol (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa
and Politik or National Unity and Politics Agency), security apparatus (TNI/Polri),
Ministry of Religion, and other government agencies in Bondowoso Regency. In
the coordination meeting, the Regent collected numerous aspirations from the
state administrators for consideration to deal with the Sunni-Shi’a conflict. The
chief of the National Unity and Politics Agency recommended the Regent not to
worry about the threat from the mass demanding the refusal of the Milad Fatimah
event. Furthermore, it was the regency government’s responsibility to maintain
Bondowoso’s concord, harmony, and social stability by considering diversity and
differences in belief (Interview with Abdul Manan/Chief of Bakesbangpol,
October 5, 2017).
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The security apparatus (TNI/Polri) proactively coordinated and
communicated with the local government chief. Both institutions recommended
the regent to immediately respond to the heated conflict by prioritizing the
security and prevention aspects (Interview with AKBP Afrisal/Chief of
Bondowoso Departmental Police, September 25, 2017). Similar views were also
stated by some members of the local House of Representatives to the regent. The
insistence of the anti-Milad Fatimah group that the regent should implement the
Governor Regulation (Pergub) on the monitoring and guidance of those religious
sects is deemed deviant. It should not necessarily be used as the juridical basis for
making policies in dealing with the Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Bondowoso. Pergub
was not based on legal regulations at a higher level. It was merely based on East
Java MUI’s Fatwa (No. Kep-01/SKF-MUI/JTM/I/2012), which was not a
representation of the state’s institution (Interview with Ahmad Fauzan, Head of
Commission IV of DPRD Bondowoso, October 10, 2017).
Almost all existing elements of the government gave constructive inputs to
the regent to make policies and decisions that are beneficial to the public,
including the Shi’a minority. They wanted Bondowoso to be well known for its
concord, peace, and tolerance in dealing with differences. Also, never wanted to
mess up kebhinekaan (unity in diversity) in Bondowoso, which was built well due
to incorrect policies in managing ethno-religious diversity and difference.
Learning from the failure to deal with similar conflicts in other regions, such as
the Sunni-Shi’a conflict case in Sampang (Madura) and Puger (Jember), the
government was expected to prioritize peaceful method in settling the conflict in
this Milad Fatimah 2016 case (Interview with Agung Tri H, Asistent I of Regent,
October 21, 2017).
The Regent Amin Said Husni also coordinated and communicated with the
East Java Governor at that time, Sukarwo on April 3, 2016. In his coordination,
the Regent reported the Sunni-Shi’a conflict situation and condition in
Bondowoso. Furthermore, the attempts made to lower the tension and to find the
best way in settling the conflict were made based on the local wisdom of
Bondowoso. The governor asked the regent to prevent the conflict from escalating
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into a clash with violence like in Sampang (Madura). The governor also facilitated
the region with additional security officers from East Java Regional Police to
ensure that the conflict was under control (Interview with Amin Said Husni,
November 20, 2017).
The local government did not merely coordinate and communicate
vertically. They also coordinated and communicated horizontally with several
social elements. MUI, FKUB, PCNU, Muhammadiyah, and figures from some
Islamic boarding schools in Bondowoso included several civil society elements
for opinions and discussion, dialog, and deliberations to find the solution for the
Sunni-Shi’a conflict. According to some administrators of PCNU Bondowoso, the
organization was in a position to give thoughts to the Regent to make the right
decisions. On some occasions, PCNU also encouraged the regent to take
immediate response to the Sunni-Shi’a conflict by passing inclusive and non-
discriminatory policies. An administrator of PCNU Bondowoso said that
Polres and Dandim were summoned, showing how great the regent
was. The regent was condemned by the right group but succeeded
in settling it culturally. The regent stated, "Shi’a is indeed different
from our (Aswaja) belief/creed, yet we cannot ignore, let alone
force them to leave.” The then Kapolres was summoned by the
regent, prevented from conducting some activities, apart from
implementing the regulation (Interview with Syaeful Bahar on
November 25, 2017).
A similar statement was issued by administrators of MUI Bondowoso
involved in a discussion that was sponsored by the Local Government. The
chairman of MUI Bondowoso, Kyai Abd. For instance, Qodir Syams prompted
the regent not to strictly follow the fatwa of MUI East Java and Governor
Regulation of East Java, which recommended the local government to monitor
and guide the groups deemed deviant from the real Islam teachings, such as the
Shi’a minority (Interview, Sept 18, 2017).
The local government also convened a meeting and dialog with the groups
directly involved in the anti-Milad Fatimah mass mobilization rally. In particular,
a discussion with several religious elites associated with FOKUS –an anti-Milad
Fatimah or Shi’a organization was held. Upon the discussion and negotiation, the
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anti-Shi’a groups were willing to lower their demand by giving space and
opportunity to the Shi’a group to organize their Milad Fatimah event, provided
that they did not invite their followers outside the region (Bondowoso) nor their
national figures, such as Jalaluddin Rahmad as a guest or speaker. Furthermore,
the anti-Milad Fatimah group from Sunni asked the government to give them the
same chance to organize a mass sermon gathering (Interview with habib Bakir,
November 25, 2017).
Based on the numerous existing regulations and results of coordination,
communication, and discussion with the local government and relevant
stakeholders, Regent Amin Said Husni took a relatively inclusive policy. In this
policy, the regent provided both permits as well as a security guarantee for both
groups involved in the conflict to organize their religious events at the same time
but in a different place. For stakeholders with a pluralistic vision, the decision
made by the regent has deemed the most accomodating policy which provides the
greater good for all parties, particularly the Shi’a minority group. Likewise, the
Shi’a group also appreciated the policy taken by the regent. A slightly different
response was shown by some of the anti-Shi’a group, who thought that the policy
passed by the regent was a form of local government’s indecisiveness in dealing
with a deviant religious sect, putting the unity of NKRI to risk (Interview with
Abdul Manan, October 5, 2017).
D. Limited Deliberative Democracy
The local government of the Bondowoso Regency made the decision and
policy to give permit and security guarantee for the Shi’a group to organize the
Milad Fatimah event and for the anti-Milad Fatimah group to hold a mass sermon
gathering. This could be interpreted as a representation of the government, which
implemented the principles of deliberative democracy in settling a religious
conflict? There are at least three parameters to be used to qualitatively assess the
policy taken by the government in response to the Sunni-Shi’a conflict. Following
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influence were the three important elements frequently used by experts in
explaining a deliberative or participatory democracy.
1. Inclusiveness
Transparency is one of the important elements of deliberative democracy.
With a transparent attitude, every person with different interests can meet,
communicate, discuss, and negotiate to reach a consensus. This was shown by
Bondowoso Regent in coordinating, consulting, communicating, and discussing
with the relevant stakeholders, ranging from the administrative bureaucracy
officials (East Java Governor, Bakesbangpol, Ministry of Religion), security
apparatus (TNI/Polri), and religious organizations (MUI, FKUB, NU,
Muhammadiyah, and Islamic boarding schools). However, the transparent attitude
in accepting opinions from the outside was evident. Without involving them, the
Regent had the authority and power to make decisions independently in settling
the Sunni-Shi’a conflict. The regent was elected and fully mandated by the people
through direct Regional Head Election (Pilkada). Nevertheless, the regent opted
to involve some related elements, from the government and the society, in making
political decisions. The regent was aware that by involving the people, the policy
product would be surely far more legitimate, transparent, and accountable
(Denhardt, 2007).
The regent was not only limited to the government elements. It also
involved the Islam civil society and organization elements such as MUI, FKUB,
NU, Muhammadiyah, Islamic boarding schools, and FOKUS. The willingness to
be involved in a coordination meeting and discussion was motivated by the
regent’s efforts to find the best approach to the Sunni-Shi’a conflict solution.
However, not all of these Islam organizations shared the same attitude and view in
response to the Sunni-Shi'a conflict. Some of them even wished the government
could take a stricter measure by refusing to issue the permit for the Milad Fatimah
event (Interview with Kyai Hasan bin Abdul Muiz, December 14, 2018). Some
encouraged the government to accommodate the Shi’a minority group’s rights to
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25, 2017). Nevertheless, they all showed an open-minded attitude to attend and
engage in a coordination and communication forum facilitated by the regent to
find a solution to the Sunni-Shi’a conflict.
It was impossible for the processes of settling this Sunni-Shi’a conflict to
run appropriately suppose each party did not put a transparent and
accommodating attitude. This involved reducing the disagreement and making
more attempts to find an agreement or compromise. Nevertheless, the participants
involved in the decision-making processes through coordination, communication,
and discussion were still limited to administrative bureaucracy elites, security
apparatus, and leaders of mainstream Islam organizations. The open public did not
widely participate when participation at a greater and wider scale (representative)
was an important requirement for a deliberative public policy-making (Carson,
2005). The more the participants and the less the participation criteria limitation,
the more participatory the democracy would be (Insua, 2008).
The Sunni-Shi’a conflict resolution processes were not fully transparent.
All parties, particularly those directly involved in the conflict, did not participate.
The counter-Milad Fatimah group joining in FOKUS was involved in the
government-facilitated communication and discussion forum. Unfortunately, no
representative of the Shi’a group such as IJABI, the main proponent of the Milad
Fatimah event, was involved in the policy-making process through the
deliberation mechanism. In this case, the chairman of IJABI Bondowoso said
Alhamdulillah, the policies of the local government have been good.
However, there is no active role in the government, especially the
Department of Religion. The problems of conflict and differences
in religious understanding are MORA's business. When Watimpres
was here, the Department of Religion had just arrived. We have
never been involved in policymaking. In general, the attitude and
policies taken by the local government in conflict resolution have
run well. We appreciate such accommodative policies, even though
none of us are involved (Interview with habib Bakir, November 25,
2017).
The Shi’a group was fairly appreciative of the local government’s stand
and policy in giving permits and security for them to organize the Milad Fatimah
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guarantee of freedom for all society elements, particularly the Shi’a minority
group in expressing their belief, an essential part of every human being (Casanova,
1992).
2. Deliberation
A state’s policy can be classified as deliberative as long as its policy-
making process was based on deliberation, discussion, and dialog with the citizens
(stakeholders). Deliberation will run well and productively when each party
involved and/or invited to is given equal access to information. Therefore, it is
important to develop various strategies to encourage a transparent discussion,
productive debate, respect, access to information, and a room to understand and
re-frame the problem to reach an agreement (Ron, 2010). It was this cooperation
(rather than competition) between ideas and parties with diverse interests that
serve as the key to enable a meeting point or a consensus. This was a political
compromise through rational public debate and negotiation rather than moral
justification and normative argumentation (Pierre Jon, 2000; Deveaux, 2003;
Bowen, 2003).
In a deliberative democracy, a decision is made through a deliberation
mechanism. According to Habermas’s perspective, this is public discursivity, not
merely based on the majority vote, but the rational acceptance of all parties. In
Habermas’s opinion, a democratic discourse presupposes (1) open and free access
for all citizens, (2) the preference transformation and objective of the participant
through the debate are possible, and (3) the decision legitimacy is accepted
through a rational deliberation (Insua, 2008); (Taylor, 1993). The more discursive
the process (rational and transparency to public review), the more legitimate the
product would be. No matter how coherent, systematic, and esthetic a policy or
public norm is, without prior discursive test in a public space or suppose it is just
established by the authority, the policy would have no legitimacy (Hardiman,
2009).
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In the Sunni-Shi’a conflict resolution in Bondowoso, the local government
employed a deliberation mechanism with the relevant stakeholders. Coordination,
consultation, discussion, and dialog were held by the regent Amin Said Husni
with the East Java Governor, TNI/Polri, Ministry of Religion, FKUB, MUI, NU,
Muhammadiyah, figures from Islamic boarding schools, and anti-Milad Fatimah
group. In general, both vertical (government with the governor) and horizontal
(government with the society) dialogs were held formally and informally. Taking
such a communicative mechanism, the local government showed its commitment
to share the problems, ideas, and notions with multi-parties, aiming to achieve a
public purpose that constituted universal rationality agreed upon by all people
(Mardiyanta, 2011; Bowen, 1999).
In explaining the role of NU’s participation, one of the NU officials stated
that:
Suppose NU goes into the middle, meaning in the battle of a
religious conflict, this is dangerous because there will be a
justification for the people to attack them (Shi’a). NU did not enter
the area of the conflict. It took a position as a conflict resolution
agent. Apart from taking part in the brakes for nahdliyin people not
to be involved in the conflict, NU also provided input to the
government to make policies that were maslahah (good) for both
Sunnis and Shi'ites (Interview with kyai Abd. Qodir Syams, Sept.
18, 2017).
The deliberation mechanism initiated by the regent was done not too
transparently for the public in general. The deliberation was limited to merely
involving the representation of stakeholders invited to be present and engaged in
the forum. Beyond those representatives, the public, could not directly access,
follow, and let alone engage in the deliberation processes. The deliberation
process was neither published nor broadcasted to the public through such media as
radio, newspapers, local television, Facebook, or other social media. The final
result of deliberation, a product of the public policy-making, was then announced
by the local government together with the stakeholders in front of the public and
covered by various mass media.
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The reason why the policy-making process could not involve the public is
that the government and relevant stakeholders were facing a situation that
required a fast and appropriate response. Without an immediate definite response
from the local government, the conflict would escalate and lead to violence. When
the local government leaders decided through deliberation, the decision was made
through a public test mechanism (Hardiman, 2009). The absence of the Shi’a
group in the deliberation to issue a public policy (no matter how responsive the
policy was to the Shi’a minority’s rights) could be deemed as a weakness. Overall,
the government policy in Sunni-Shi’a conflict resolution had fairly strong
legitimacy since it was acceptable and complied with by the majority of the
Bondowoso public (Hardiman, 2009).
3. Influence
Public opinion is meaningless without impact on the policy-making by the
government. Even when the government involves the public in the process of
making its policies through a deliberation mechanism, the policy made could not
be democratic suppose it ignores these public aspirations (Deveaux, 2003). The
extent of public aspirations produced through the deliberation mechanism affects
the policy-making. This is one of the important things in deliberative democracy
principles. The greater the influence of public capacity on the government’s
policy-making, the more deliberative that policy made (Hartz-Karp, 2005).
Public involvement in a set of coordinations, consultations, discussions,
and communications with Regent Amin Said Husni has a significant influence on
public decision or policy (Hartz-Karp, 2005). Suppose the public had no adequate
capacity; it was less likely that their opinions would be considered by the regent in
making such an unpopular policy. The Sunni-Shi’a conflict incident in Sampang
(Madura), affirmed that the government policy was influenced or produced
through a discussion mechanism with the public. Unfortunately, the dominant
influence came from the intolerant public section, hence the policy made by the
government was exclusionary to the Shi’a minority group’s rights (Miichi, 2016).
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In the conflict resolution of the Sunni-Shi’a in Bondowoso, the aspirations
considered by the government were not just from certain groups. All public
aspirations related to the aspirations of the two conflicting groups and the
stakeholders were seriously considered by the government (Interview with Agung
Tri H., October 21, 2017). This gave a strong impression that the public aspiration
or opinion tested first through dialog, negotiation, and compromise mechanisms
(based on rational argumentation, rather than moral-normative justification) had a
significant influence on the Sunni-Shi’a conflict resolution (Deveaux, 2003). The
local government’s decision to give a permit and protection to all groups,
including the Shi’a minority, to organize their religious rite with the collectively
agreed-upon provisions came from the public opinion rather than the state.
When the government’s decision was based on the discussion and dialog
with the public, the public involvement in the making of a decision was highly
crucial. This is in line with Fraser’s theory, which states that the public is in a
strong position. for this reason, they could be involved in shaping opinions and
making decisions. The government also played an important role in making
themselves available as a public arena for shaping opinions and making decisions.
Its transparency along with society’s discursive involvement were the keys to
democratically settling the Sunni-Shi’a conflict (Mujiburrahman, 2007). In this
case, Hefner (2000; 2001) established that democratic life depended on the
government and the resources and habits that grow and develop in society.
E. Conclusion
This paper showed that the local government of Bondowoso features
inclusivism in responding to the Sunni-Shi’a conflicts. This attitude was reflected
in its policies by allowing and protecting the religious gathering (pengajian)
conducted by Shi’a and Sunni groups. This policy was adopted by the Regent
after communicating with the East Java Governor and coordination with the State
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National Armed Force (TNI)/Indonesian National Police (Polri)), leaders of the
Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), and discussion with the stakeholders,
including the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), Religious Harmony Forum
(known as FKUB), NU, and Muhammadiyah. The presence of local governments
with their inclusivism ensured that the resolution of religious conflicts in
Bondowoso was made in the corridors of deliberative democratic principles,
following Carson and Hartz-Karp’s theoretical framework.
The deliberative policy model adopted by the local government of
Bondowoso had some limitations. For instance, the decision-making process
based on a mutual discussion was not completely open for the public on a more
extensive scale to access. Furthermore, the decision-making process still could be
said exclusionary to the minority voices, though the decision products were
adequately inclusionary to the rights of minority Shi’a. The criteria of
stakeholders from the Islamic civil society circles involved in the decision making
was limited only to the mainstream Islamic organizations. Moreover, the decisions
made were contemporary responses to resolve the Sunni-Shi’a conflicts. No
further discussions to correct, examine, and revise the decision-making results to
make regulations with legal force to guarantee religious freedom were made.
This paper only examined government involvement in peacefully
resolving the Sunni-Shi'a conflicts in Bondowoso within a certain period.
Specifically, this could be the Regent Amin Said Husni’s second-term (2013-
2018). Other interesting issues can be elaborated more through future researches
by correlating the topics of Sunni-Shi’a conflict resolutions on minority and
intolerant groups, grassroots communities, and women activists as the actual
topics to develop in future studies. The dynamics of Sunni-Shi’a conflict
management in Bondowoso after the regime change in 2018 can be a longitudinal
and challenging topic. The new Regent will possibly continue with the existing
policies. However, it can modify or make different policies issued by previous
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